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Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Gender
Gap for Securities and Exchange
Commission Attorneys
Stephen J. Choi New York University
Mitu Gulati Duke University
A. C. Pritchard University of Michigan
Abstract
Most research on the gender gap in the legal profession focuses on the private
sector. We look at the gender gap in a setting where one might expect the gaps
to be smaller: the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), which has a reputation for providing employees with good child-
care and work flexibility. We find a substantial gender gap in assignments but
only a modest one in pay. Men are also more likely to move laterally and more
likely to move to lucrative private-sector jobs. What causes these gaps? The pri-
mary explanation for the gender gap from the extant literature is the gender dif-
ferential in childcare. We do not find substantial evidence that having children
affects pay and assignments at the SEC. The presence of children, however, does
seem to affect the behavior of men and women differently in deciding when to
leave the SEC.
1. Introduction
Gender gaps in wages, promotions, and employment rates have been docu-
mented across a wide range of labor markets (Altonji and Blank 1999; Blau and
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Kahn 2017). One of the most extensively studied is the market for elite private-
sector lawyers (Gorman 2006; Sterling and Reichman 2013, 2016). What is clear
from the literature is that gaps exist across the board and invariably go in one
direction: women are paid and promoted less. Unpacking the causal dynamic for
the gap, however, has proved difficult. That said, one of the primary explanations
given for the deficit in the literature is the gender differential in care, and espe-
cially childcare, responsibilities (Kleven, Landais, and Sogaard 2018; Slaughter
2015; Plickert and Sterling 2017).
In this article, we attempt to add to the understanding of the gender gap in the
legal profession, particularly as a function of differential family responsibilities,
by approaching it from a different direction than most of the prior studies. In-
stead of looking at the elite private bar-where one might expect the willingness
and ability to adjust for differentials in childcare responsibilities to be relatively
low-we examine attorneys at the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which has a reputation for allowing flexible work
schedules and providing high-quality childcare.
Public-sector institutions such as the SEC, however, no matter how progressive
and child friendly they might be, do not exist in a vacuum. One of the primary
benefits of working at an elite public institution such as the SEC is that it provides
a pathway to the elite private sector via the lateral market. For our purposes, the
benefit of this public-private pipeline is that it allows us to examine how the out-
side market (one that the literature tells us to expect to be less woman friendly)
interacts with the internal labor market of the SEC.
Research shows that gender gaps tend to be large in elite private-sector jobs for
lawyers (Scharf, Liebenberg, and Amalfe 2014) but smaller in the public sector
(Gregory and Borland 1999; Bolton and de Figueiredo 2017). Male and female
securities lawyers, therefore, may weigh private-sector and government jobs dif-
ferently. The strength of these preferences, however, may vary with family cir-
cumstances, including responsibility for children. Lawyers at elite government
jobs often get experience, training, and publicity that they could not match in
the private sector (see Wilkins [1999], which examines the paths taken by the
first generation of African American partners at elite firms). By examining an
elite government job that may afford women greater training opportunities than
the equivalent private-sector job, and that also provides lateral employment pos-
sibilities into lucrative private-sector jobs, we hope to gain new insight into the
dynamics of the gender gap.
Our sample consists of the attorneys in the SEC's Division of Enforcement in
2004; we follow their career trajectories through 2016. An advantage of studying
this group of lawyers is the availability of data on their assignments; most stud-
ies of lawyers do not have access to these types of data. Azmat and Ferrer (2017),
for example, use hours billed as a key measure of lawyers' performance. We are
able to go beyond that by looking at the specific type of assignments the lawyers
perform at the SEC. These data allow us to control for quality of work experience
and how it influences gender gaps in lateral job opportunities.
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We find evidence of gender gaps at the SEC. Men, over time, get more com-
plex, high-profile assignments that might attract the attention of future employ-
ers. We do not find such a gap in compensation. Men are paid more on average,
but the gap is modest and is not statistically significant in our multivariate anal-
ysis. When we examine who moves laterally, we find that men are more likely
to leave, and when they do, they are more likely to move to the private sector.
Women are more likely to move to the public or nonprofit sector.
To identify the causal relationship between gender and these gaps, we look at
two aspects of the family environment that may shed light on whether gender-
based preferences and responsibilities relating to family influence the gender gap.
The first is childcare obligations, which is the dominant explanation for the gen-
der gap in the literature. The second is an event that might be expected to increase
childcare responsibilities, that is, when a nonsibling adult who lives with the SEC
attorney moves to a different address (typically but not necessarily divorce-a
companion- separation event). We do not find evidence of a gender compensa-
tion gap with respect to childcare obligations but do find limited evidence that a
companion- separation event corresponds with gender compensation gaps in the
SEC. Child-related differentials also show up when we examine lateral departures
from the SEC. In particular, women with children make different choices about
whether and when to move laterally than their male peers.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides background and hypotheses. Section
3 describes our sample and empirical tests. Section 4 concludes.
2. Background and Hypotheses
2.1. Gender Gaps in the Legal Profession
Our focus in this article is on the gender gap in the legal profession. Women
have been going to law school in large numbers for at least 2 decades (Com-
mission on Women in the Profession 2006, 2018). Legal education occurs at
the graduate level and requires substantial investment. Students who go to law
school, and particularly those who follow that by seeking an elite government job,
we assume, tend to be dedicated to their future careers as lawyers.
Despite numerical equality among law school graduates, gender gaps persist in
the profession. Female lawyers make 85 percent of what male lawyers earn (Dino-
vitzer et al. 2009), a narrowing of a long-standing disparity (Hagan 1990). Gen-
der gaps in pay appear to increase at more senior levels.! Finding a differential in
wages, however, does not establish discrimination if we do not have data on job
performance; employees with similar jobs can perform quite differently (Azmat
and Ferrer 2017). Furthermore, attrition rates among female lawyers, particularly
at early stages of a career, are higher than those for men (Kay, Alarie, and Adjei
After the JD (Dinovitzer et al. 2004, 2009), an examination of lawyers' careers, finds that gender
gaps in salaries increase over time, from roughly $6,000 initially to approximately $20,000 after 7
years in practice. See Sterling and Reichman (2013).
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2016). But attrition rates alone do not tell us much unless we control for other ex-
planations such as increased childcare responsibilities (Sommerlad 2016).
Scholars have posited the existence of structural discrimination (Sturm 2001;
Wilkins and Gulati 1998; Chambliss 1997). Explicit gender animus is disfavored
in settings such as high-level legal jobs. These institutions are not only subject to
employment laws that prohibit discrimination but tend to be publicly commit-
ted to promoting gender equality. How do gender gaps arise in such a setting?
One answer is that private firms, which must deal with competitive markets, may
be unwilling or unable to expend resources to change structural features of the
workplace (for example, long hours) that would allow employees who need more
flexibility to succeed (Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor 1996; Thornton 2016). These
work characteristics may produce two tracks to advancement, with those con-
strained by the structural barriers ending up on the less demanding track.
In public employment, the commitment to equal treatment of workers is
likely to be at least as strong as, if not stronger than, in the private sector. In ad-
dition, government decision makers, unconstrained by market forces, may be
better placed to invest in overcoming structural barriers. Structural discrimina-
tion models suggest two distinct effects for employment as a government law-
yer. On the one hand, because of perceived barriers in the private sector, female
lawyers who seek fulfilling and challenging work lives should, other things equal,
value government work more than their male counterparts. On the other hand,
if women want private-sector positions but cannot access them through the tra-
ditional inside-the-firm pathways, government employment might provide an al-
ternate route to an eventual high-level position in the private sector.
For lawyers in the federal government, one study finds that women report
earning 6 percent less than men (Dinovitzer et al. 2009). Part of the gap may be
explained by the fact that women employed as lawyers by the federal government
report working fewer hours than their male counterparts. This could reflect either
a choice by women to work fewer hours or supervisors giving them less substan-
tive assignments (Sterling and Reichman 2016).
Given their commitment to nondiscrimination, we expect government institu-
tions like the SEC to adopt procedures to ensure that male and female employees
are treated equally in case assignments. It is possible, however, that despite a fa-
cial commitment to nondiscrimination, the work environment may result in dif-
ferential case assignments for men and women. Alternatively, men and women
may have different preferences with respect to work and family environments,
and this difference may produce a gap in case assignments. Gender differences
are likely to emerge, we conjecture, as women get married (or cohabitate with a
nonsibling adult companion) and have children. These changes may lead women
to reduce their hours, go part-time, or take temporary absences from the work-
force. The career costs of these temporary or partial opt outs can be high. In this
regard, professions may vary in terms of employees' substitutability. In phar-
macy, for example, the jobs tend to be standardized, and pharmacists can step
in for each other. This flexibility has been posited as a reason for why the gen-
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der gap among pharmacists has become relatively small (Goldin 2014). By con-
trast, a trial lawyer running a case-who develops an understanding of the facts
and legal theories, attends all the hearings, runs the depositions, and formulates
a strategy-cannot be easily replaced by another attorney.2 For high-level gov-
ernment lawyers, particularly those experienced enough to assume managerial
responsibilities, there may be little flexibility for those with care responsibilities,
which increases the gender gap. In addition, the perception that women are more
likely to opt out of challenging work may lead supervisors to assign them fewer or
less- challenging cases.
2.2. Securities and Exchange Commission Background
The SEC is an elite government agency. Its reputation, coupled with the
private-sector employment opportunities available to lawyers with SEC experi-
ence, translates into strong demand for jobs in the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment. A lawyer seeking even an entry-level position typically needs several years
of legal experience and strong academic credentials. Higher-level positions re-
quire more experience, with top-level positions commonly filled by lawyers with
long experience in the division or by partners at white-shoe firms.
The division's reputation for effectiveness helps fuel the revolving door-law-
yers involved in the highest-profile matters have a leg up in finding a private-
sector job. Public-sector experience-particularly in an elite enforcement set-
ting-can be a stepping stone to the private sector (deHaan et al. 2015; Boylan
2005; Boylan and Long 2005). Individuals may view time spent working in gov-
ernment as an investment in human capital (Sauer 1998), offering an opportunity
to specialize (Dinovitzer et al. 2004). Experience at the SEC is a valuable creden-
tial, lending individuals credibility as white-collar defense attorneys, for conduct-
ing internal investigations, or for serving as legal advisors to firms in financial
services regulated by the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
The revolving door between government and the private sector creates another
opportunity for the gender gap to manifest itself Having children is more likely
to depress women's income in the private sector than in government (Dixon and
Seron 1995). This suggests that there may be greater barriers to women advanc-
ing in law firm tournaments than in government jobs (Sterling and Reichman
2016). Employees (former and current) at the SEC with whom we had informal
discussions uniformly described the SEC as child friendly with flexible hours and
quality childcare.
The gender gap may also manifest itself among those who stay at the SEC. Not
everyone will succeed in translating their SEC experience into lucrative private-
sector employment. Some attorneys stay at the SEC by choice, but others may
2 For discussions of how the lack of flexibility in legal jobs has disadvantaged women (or how the
requests for flexibility can stigmatize those who ask for them), see Gorman (2006) and Thornton
(2016). A recent, and much discussed, study of what is perhaps one of the most flexible jobs being
an Uber driver suggests that the gender gap can persist even in highly flexible settings (Cook et al.
2018).
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stay because their available private-sector opportunities are less attractive than
those available to their colleagues. This possibility suggests a reverse selection ef-
fect, with the top performers leaving for more lucrative opportunities and the less
ambitious staying behind (Goddeeris 1988). It also suggests, to the extent that
there are stronger biases against women in the private sector, that women might
be disadvantaged in obtaining lucrative lateral opportunities. On the other hand,
if women do not fare as well in the private sector because they are given less train-
ing, mentorship, and sponsorship at early stages, some might choose to overcome
those obstacles by gaining experience in a government setting that is more com-
mitted to women's development.
3. Data and Results
3.1. Sample
Our sample consists of attorneys who worked in the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment in 2004; we obtained their names from the SEC's 2004 telephone directory.3
There are 542 attorneys in the sample. Variable definitions are in Appendix A,
and the details of our data collection are in Appendix B.
We classify attorneys hierarchically. Our categories, measured in 2004, are staff
attorney, which consists of attorneys employed at the SK- 14 pay scale or below
and considered the entry-level attorneys, and top manager, which consists of at-
torneys employed at the SK-17 pay scale or above and who typically have the
title assistant director, assistant district administrator, assistant regional director,
or higher. Staff attorney is an entry-level position requiring limited prior experi-
ence. These attorneys do the bulk of the investigative work of the division. Top
managers have supervisory responsibilities, which means they typically appear in
more cases than subordinates. They are also more likely to be in a position to be
recognized by private-sector employers. The baseline for comparison is all attor-
neys in pay grades SK- 15 and SK- 16, which we term midlevel attorneys.
We also distinguish among SEC offices. We code attorneys as regional if they
work in an office other than New York or Washington, DC, in 2004. Given the
concentration of the financial services industry in New York and the concentra-
tion of the white- collar- defense bar in Washington, attorneys in those offices may
have more private-sector options than attorneys working in regional offices such
as Fort Worth. At the same time, the cost of living in Washington and New York
may also drive an exodus from the SEC for those with opportunities, particularly
for individuals with children leaving for college. Attorneys working in lower-cost
cities may feel less financial pressure to leave the SEC.
We create an indicator variable to reflect work experience prior to coming to
the SEC: NLJ 250 Prior Partner, which equals one if the attorney was a partner
at one of the 250 largest law firms in the United States before coming to the SEC
and zero otherwise. To control for prior government experience, we create the
3 We were unable to find SEC telephone directories more recent than the 2004 edition.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
N Mean Median SD
Attorney level:
Age 386 40.6 40.0 7.884
NLJ 250 Prior Partner 363 .066 0 .249
Prior Government Attorney 363 .176 0 .382
Top Law School 411 .453 0 .498
Regional Office 418 .438 0 .497
Staff Attorney 411 .372 0 .484
Top Manager 411 .229 0 .421
Female 418 .304 0 .460
Short Term 418 .471 0 .500
Long Term 418 .127 0 .333
Close to Retire 407 .039 0 .195
Attorney year level:
Companion Separate 4,598 .014 0 .116
Child at Home 3,707 .368 0 .482
Child < 5 3,707 .057 0 .231
Child 6 14 3,707 .223 0 .416
Child 15 18 3,707 .137 0 .344
Scienter Cases in Prior Year 4,180 .083 0 .359
Note. Attorney level variables are measured in 2004.
indicator variable Prior Government Attorney. For educational background, we
use the law school attended. We define Top Law School as the top 18 law schools
as ranked by U.S. News and World Report in 1992.
We construct indicator variables relating to an attorney's tenure at the SEC.
We classify attorneys who started at the SEC in 1990 or earlier with the vari-
able Long Term (indicating 15 or more years of experience at the SEC as of the
end of 2004). We classify attorneys who started in 2000 or later with the variable
Short Term (corresponding to attorneys with 5 or fewer years of experience at the
SEC as of the end of 2004). We use Short Term to examine the career patterns of
the relatively recent hires at the SEC as of 2004. The baseline category (Medium
Term) consists of attorneys who started at the SEC between 1991 and 1999.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on characteristics of the SEC enforce-
ment attorneys measured at the beginning of the data set in 2004. The average age
of the SEC attorneys at the beginning of 2004 was 40.6 years. Women were 30.4
percent of the sample. Nearly 4 percent of the attorneys were close to retirement
age in 2004, defined as 55 or older in 2004 (which equates to over 65 by 2015).
Attorneys in the short-term group make up 47.1 percent of the sample; 12.7 per-
cent were long-term SEC attorneys. Only 6.6 percent of the SEC attorneys had
been partners at large firms before joining the SEC. In contrast, 17.6 percent of
the SEC attorneys had served as a government attorney prior to joining the SEC.
Almost half (45.3 percent) attended a top law school. Attorneys who were em-
ployed in regional or district offices (other than New York or Washington, DC)
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in 2004 made up 43.8 percent of the sample. In terms of job titles, those who
were staff attorneys in 2004 made up 37.2 percent of the sample. Top managers
in 2004 made up 22.9 percent of the sample. With regard to variables relating to
the family environment, 1.4 percent of the attorneys experienced a companion-
separation event in any given year during our sample period. A little more than
a third (36.8 percent) of the attorneys had a child at home in a given year during
our sample period.
We also perform t-tests of the difference by gender of each attorney charac-
teristic variable (except Female). Men, on average, were slightly older (41.0 years
versus 39.6 at the beginning of 2004; difference significant at the 10 percent level,
p .093). The other t-tests were insignificant.
3.2. Dependent Variables
Our empirical tests examine gender gaps in three areas: assignments, compen-
sation, and departures from the SEC. The last area is outside the control of the
SEC but may be affected by attorneys' work experiences while at the agency.
3.2.1. Case Assignments
We first examine differences in case assignments. We use case assignments in-
volving fraud allegations that require a showing of scienter as a proxy for quality
of work experience at the SEC. The SEC has a range of violations that it can al-
lege, including actions involving inaccurate disclosures that can be premised on
negligence or strict liability, but these tend to reflect less harm to investors. Alle-
gations of fraud requiring proof of scienter are challenging to bring because they
are more complex, often resulting in contested litigation. These cases involve se-
rious disclosure violations and the largest potential penalties. Consequently, sci-
enter cases against public companies and subsidiaries are typically higher profile
and attract press coverage. Overall, a higher number of scienter cases for an at-
torney suggests greater involvement in enforcing substantial fraud violations that
are more likely to get attention from private-sector employers.
Cases involving fraud, however, are likely to be more contentious than cases
alleging regulatory violations, so lawyers who are averse to conflict may avoid
them. Note here that we know only the fact that attorneys are assigned to these
more challenging cases.4 On the basis of our informal discussions with Division
of Enforcement attorneys, we conjecture that attorneys perceived as high per-
' The charges filed are not known at the time of the initial assignment, and the severity of the of
fense is revealed only during the course of the investigation. In addition, the investigating attorney
has room to lobby for more serious charges if he or she thinks they are warranted. The variable Sci
enter Cases is underinclusive in that it does not include investigations that do not lead to the filing
of a complaint. We also do not track SEC attorneys' involvement in actions involving only private
companies, individuals, or administrative proceedings. (Prior to 2010, the SEC did not regularly list
the attorneys involved in SEC administrative proceedings.) It therefore excludes cases such as Ponzi
schemes and pump and dump schemes, which primarily involve individual defendants. Those cases
likely provide experience less relevant to elite private sector employers.
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formers will be assigned to these more complex cases because bosses benefit from
their subordinates winning difficult cases. It is also possible, however, that bi-
ases play a role in assignments. In addition, although many cases are assigned by
higher-ups within the division, other assignments result from lower-level attor-
neys pursuing a lead.
We collect SEC civil cases involving scienter allegations against public compa-
nies and their subsidiaries from 2005 to 2015 and compute the number of cases
alleging scienter in which an attorney was involved for each year in our data
set (Scienter Cases). As an alternative measure, we look at the number of civil
insider-trading cases against any defendant to which an attorney is assigned from
2005 to 2015. Like scienter cases against public companies, insider-trading cases
brought by the SEC can involve both publicity and high complexity. Insider-
trading offenses require proof of a number of challenging elements, including
scienter, because most cases allege violations of Rule 10b-5.
Men are involved in twice as many scienter cases each year compared with
women (means of. 130 and .065, respectively; difference significant at the 1 per-
cent level, p .000).5 The mean number of scienter cases is small but important
for the reputation and career of an attorney given the high-profile nature of these
cases. We find a similar disparity for insider-trading cases, with men involved in
a mean of.303 insider-trading cases each year and women in a mean of. 176 (dif-
ference significant at the 1 percent level, p .000).
Figure 1 shows the gap between men and women with respect to the number
of yearly scienter case assignments by age.6 Note from Figure 1 that men consis-
tently receive more yearly scienter case assignments compared with women. This
gap narrows for men and women in their early to mid-40s but then widens again
past the mid-40s until age 60 and older.
7
3.2.2. Salary
We look at the base salaries and bonuses for the attorneys in our sample (Total
Compensation) for each year from 2004 to 2015 or until the last year the attorney
was employed at the SEC. The mean total compensation is $179,700 for men and
$177,700 for women. This $2,000 difference in compensation per year is statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level (p .037) but represents little more than
1 percent of the total compensation. Figure 2 presents mean total compensation
(equal to base salary plus bonus) and shows that men and women of similar ages
at the SEC generally receive similar compensation. Men receive higher total com-
' For most attorneys, the number of scienter cases in any given year is zero (91 percent of the
attorney years in our data set). The next most frequent occurrence is one scienter case in a year (7
percent of the attorney years). Multiple scienter cases occur in 2 percent of the attorney years.
6 Attorneys younger than 30 and older than 70 are excluded from Figure 1, as the small number of
observations involved makes the presentation subject to outliers. Those attorneys are included in the
statistical analysis that follows. To smooth out yearly variations, Figure 1 reflects the mean number
of scienter cases per year in 5 year bins starting at age 30.
7 We find a similar pattern for insider trading cases, with the difference that the gap appears to
narrow for men and women in their late 40s instead of early to mid 40s and then widens after age 50.
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Figure 2. Mean total compensation
pensation from their mid-40s to around age 50, but women in their early 50s
to late 50s earn more than men. In Appendix C we construct an abnormal total
compensation measure controlling for pre-SEC hiring characteristics of the at-
torneys. We observe a similar although not identical pattern for our measure of
abnormal total compensation, with men receiving higher abnormal total com-
pensation than women in their 40s to early 50s but with the gap narrowing in
their mid- to late 50s.
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Figure 3. Attorneys employed at the Securities and Exchange Commission
3.2.3. Lateral Moves
Finally, we are interested in gender differences in departures from the Division
of Enforcement. We define departure from the SEC as being no longer employed
by the SEC in 2016. Male attorneys are more likely to exit than female attorneys.
Of the attorneys in the sample in 2004, 58.8 percent of the men departed the SEC
by 2016, but only 40.9 percent of the women did (difference significant at the
1 percent level, p -. 001).8 Figure 3 shows the fraction of SEC attorneys by age
in our data set who are still at the SEC. Figure 3 shows that women are more in-
dined to stay at the SEC until around age 50, possibly because of family consid-
erations. We test the relation between the presence of children at home and the
propensity to leave the SEC below. After age 50, as attorneys presumably come
closer to the end of their careers, there is less of a clear pattern between men and
women departing the SEC.
Figures 1-3 set forth the basic gender compensation and assignment gaps in
the data for SEC enforcement attorneys. We move now to the multivariate anal-
ysis to investigate if we can explain the gaps in terms of observable features relat-
ing to family obligations.
3.3. Case Assignments
We begin our multivariate testing with case assignments. We estimate a re-
gression model with Scienter Cases as the dependent variable using attorney-year
8 We also examined the duration of employment at the SEC for the attorneys in our sample, de-
fined as the number of years worked at the SEC up to and including 2016. For purposes of duration,
we count a partial year as a full year at the SEC. Male attorneys have a shorter duration (15.7 years)
compared with female attorneys (16.3 years), but the difference is not significantly different from 0.
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data with year fixed effects and errors clustered by attorney. The base model
(model 1) is
Scienter Cases, = a + 31,Age, + 32,iAge Squared + 33,NLJ 250 Prior Partner
+ h3,Prior Government Attorney + 13,Top Law School
+ 36, Regional Office + 3, Female + Ei.
For independent variables, we include Age, Age Squared to control for nonlinear-
ities in the relationship between age and Scienter Cases, and the following indica-
tor variables: NLJ 250 Prior Partners, for attorneys who come to the agency with
more experience; Prior Government Attorney, for attorneys who have relevant
experience with enforcement work; Top Law School; Regional Office, to reflect a
different mix of cases; and Female. We report the results for model 1 of Table 2.
In model 1, the coefficient on Female is negative and significant at the 1 per-
cent level. Women work on .064 fewer scienter cases than men each year. This
is consistent with the summary statistic comparison of the mean scienter cases
discussed above that indicates that men are assigned to approximately twice as
many scienter cases as women. Looking at the control variables, we see that key
variables point in predicted directions. Attorneys in regional offices have .060
fewer scienter cases per year (significant at the 1 percent level in model 1), which
makes sense since the more complex and difficult cases are typically handled in
New York and Washington. The magnitude of the negative relationship of Fe-
male on Scienter Cases in Prior Year and Regional Office on Scienter Cases in
Prior Year are similar.
Returning to gender, to examine the correspondence between case assignments
and tenure, we add to model 1 the indicator variables Short Term and Long Term
and interaction terms Female x Short Term and Female x Long Term. (Medium
Term is the base category in these models.) Time spent at the SEC may affect the
expertise and strength of relationships enjoyed by an attorney at the SEC, which
may affect case assignments. We report the results in model 2 of Table 2. The co-
efficient on Female is negative and significant at the 1 percent level (as in model
1), which indicates that women receive fewer scienter case assignments than
men. The coefficient on Female x Short Term is positive and significant at the
10 percent level, and the sum of Female and Female x Short Term, which rep-
resents the difference between men and women who are short-term employees, is
negative and significant at the 10 percent level. The gap between men and women
is smaller for short-term attorneys but still (weakly) statistically significant. The
coefficient on Female x Long Term is positive and significant at the 10 percent
level, and the sum of Female and Female x Long Term, which represents the
difference between men and women who are long-term employees, is not signifi-
cantly different from 0. In effect, we find that the gender gap in assignments ex-
ists only marginally for the recent hires at the SEC and not at all for the veterans.
Instead, the gender gap is largely driven by women in the middle to late-middle
Table 2
Case Assignment Regression Models
Age
Age Squared






Female x Short Term
Long Term
Female x Long Term
Child at Home
Female x Child at Home
Child < 5
Female x Child < 5
Child 6 14
Female x Child 6 14
Child 15 18
Female x Child 15 18
Companion Separate
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stages of their careers (similar to our finding in Figure 1), who appear to either
receive or take on fewer complex assignments.9
Our results indicate that although women start out working on roughly the
same mix of cases as men, gender gaps in assignments emerge as women reach
the middle stages of their careers at the SEC. What explains the gap in case as-
signments? Is there something about the nature of challenging investigations
that those lacking flexible schedules (that is, childcare responsibilities that are
assumed to fall disproportionately on women) cannot take them on? As noted
earlier, gender differences in childcare responsibilities are frequently cited as the
key factor contributing to the gender gap (Kleven, Landais, and Sogaard 2018;
Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007).
To disentangle the causal reason for this disparity, we look at two shifts in the
family environment that may affect men and women differently. If women and
men have different work-family preferences or esponsibilities, a shift in an at-
torney's family situation should have a differential impact on men and women.
We first focus on whether the attorney lives in a household with a child who is
18 or younger (Child at Home)-roughly corresponding to precollege years-or
in a household without such children. We conjecture that attorneys with children
at home have greater household responsibilities. That in turn, other things equal,
should affect job performance. In particular, if childcare responsibilities fall dis-
proportionately on women, we should see the child penalty in the form of worse
assignments also fall disproportionately on women.
We estimate difference-in- differences models of the difference between scien-
ter cases assigned to men and women. For model 3 of Table 2, we add the indica-
tor variable Child at Home and the interaction term Female x Child at Home to
our base model.
The impact having of a child at home may vary according to the age of the
child. For example, having pre-elementary-school children at home, who require
greater care, may have a different effect on attorneys compared with having older
children at home. To test this possibility, we create three additional indicator
variables for whether in a particular year the attorney has a child between the
ages of zero and five (Child < 5), six and 14 (Child 6-14), or 15 and 18 (Child
15-18). We reestimate model 3, replacing Child at Home with Child < 5, Child
9 As a robustness test (unreported), we added indicator variables for whether the SEC attorney is
a staff attorney or top manager at the SEC to model 1 of Table 2. An attorney's position at the SEC
may affect the number of scienter cases to which he or she is assigned irrespective of gender. Gen
der, however, may correlate with promotion to higher positions, such as top manager, so including
those controls may bias against finding a gender effect. The coefficient on Staff Attorney is negative
and significant at the 10 percent level, while the coefficient on Top Manager is positive and signifi
cant at the 1 percent level, consistent with our expectations. The coefficient on Female remains neg
ative and significant at the 1 percent level. As an additional robustness test, we replaced the number
of scienter cases for a given year with the number of insider trading cases for a given year as the
dependent variable in model 1 of Table 2. The coefficient on Female remains negative and significant
at the 5 percent level in the model (unreported). Women receive fewer insider trading case assign
ments compared with men.
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6-14, and Child 15-18 and interaction terms between these indicator variables
and Female. We report the results in model 4 of Table 2.
Our second shift is separation from a companion (typically, divorce). We de-
fine Companion Separate as equal to one if the year or immediate prior year (a
2-year window) is the last year in which the SEC attorney and companion share a
household. Again, we conjecture that separation and the additional burdens that
result from having two households will hurt job performance-and more so for
women, under the assumption that they take the brunt of sudden unexpected in-
creases in care responsibilities. To test this conjecture, we replace Child at Home
and the interaction term Child at Home x Female in model 1 with an indicator
variable for Companion Separate and the interaction term Female x Compan-
ion Separate that measures the difference in difference. We report the results in
model 5 of Table 2.
The coefficient on the interaction terms Female x Child at Home in model 3
and Female x Child < 5 and Female x Child 6-14 in model 4 of Table 2 are not
significantly different from 0. The coefficient on Female x Child 15-18 is positive
in model 4 but significant only at the 10 percent level. Having a high-school-age
child at home has a more positive impact on the number of scienter cases for
women than men. The magnitude of Female x Child 15-18 is equal to .123 more
scienter cases per year. While small, the magnitude is almost double the negative
effect of Female alone (equal to .067 fewer scienter cases in model 4) and poten-
tially important given the high-profile nature of scienter cases. The sum of Fe-
male and Female x Child 15-18 is positive and not significantly different from
0, which indicates that the differential between men and women in terms of sci-
enter case assignments diminishes for attorneys with high-school-age children.0
Finally, the coefficient on Female x Companion Separate is not significantly dif-
ferent from 0. We thus find mixed evidence that family-related factors explain
the gender differences in scienter case assignments. Although there is limited ev-
idence that the gender gap in case assignments diminishes for women with high-
school-age children, we do not find any other evidence that family matters.
We also estimate attorney fixed-effects models to assess the impact of family-
related shifts on individual attorneys, using the same variables as in models 3-5
of Table 2 (with the exception of Female), including year effects and clustering
errors by attorney. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those for
models 3-5 of Table 2, with the exception that Female x Child 15-18, while still
positive, is not significantly different from 0. That is, we do not find evidence that
any of our family-related shifts result in a change in case assignments for either
male or female attorneys in the attorney fixed-effects models.
" We created an indicator variable for whether the attorney has a child 19 or older (Child 19+).
We reestimated model 4 of Table 2 with the addition of Child 19+ and Female x Child 19+, treat
ing attorneys with no children as the base category. We obtained the same qualitative results (unre
ported) as in model 4 with one difference: the coefficient on Female x Child 15 18 is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level instead of the 10 percent level. The coefficients on Child 19+ and
Female x Child 19+ are not significantly different from 0.
The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
3.4. Compensation
We next look at gender differences in compensation. We estimate a regression
model with Total Compensation as the dependent variable using attorney-year
data with year fixed effects and errors clustered by attorney. The base model (re-
ported as model 1 of Table 3) is as follows:
Total Compensation =at + l3,iAge + /32iAge Squared + f3iNLJ 250 Prior Partner/
+ /34 Prior Government Attorney + /3, Top Law School/
+ /36iRegional Office + /3iFemalei + Fi .
We include the independent variables Age, Age Squared, NLJ 250 Prior Partner,
Prior Government Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, and Female to as-
sess the relationship between the various attorney characteristic variables and pay
at the SEC.
In model 1 of Table 3, the negative coefficient on Female corresponds to $2,170
less in compensation per year for women compared with men. The coefficient on
Female, however, is not significantly different from 0. Moreover, $2,170 is small
in magnitude, representing a little over 1 percent of the mean total compensation
for men and women. We find no evidence in our multivariate model that women
receive appreciably lower pay than men at the SEC.
To assess whether fewer scienter case assignments in the prior year is related
to lower salaries for women, we add Scienter Cases in Prior Year to model 1 and
report the results in model 2 of Table 3. The coefficient on Scienter Cases in Prior
Year is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, corresponding to $6,661
higher total compensation for each scienter case in the prior year. As in model 1,
the coefficient on Female in model 2 is not significantly different from 0.11 After
controlling for who is performing complex assignments, we are unable to reject
the null hypothesis that female SEC attorneys are paid the same as men.2
To look at whether family shifts might correspond with gender-based differ-
entials in compensation, we estimate a series of difference-in- differences models,
adding additional variables to model 2 of Table 3. In model 3 of Table 3, we add
the indicator variable Child at Home and the interaction term Female x Child
at Home. In model 4 of Table 3, we add the indicator variables Child < 5, Child
6-14, and Child 15-18 and interaction terms between these variables and Female.
" We also performed a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on Female are equal in
models 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated estimation and were unable to reject the null hypothesis.
12 As a robustness test (unreported), we added indicator variables for whether the SEC attorney
is a staff attorney or top manager at the SEC to model 1 of Table 3. The coefficient on Staff Attorney
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient on Top Manager is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on Female remains not significantly different from
0. As another robustness test, we replaced the number of scienter cases in the prior year with the
number of insider trading cases in the prior year in model 2 of Table 3. The coefficient for the num
ber of insider trading cases in the prior year is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. As in
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In model 5 of Table 3, we add the indicator variable Companion Separate and the
interaction term Female x Companion Separate.
In models 3-5 of Table 3, the coefficients on Female are negative but not sig-
nificantly different from 0. The coefficients on the presence of a child in two in-
stances (Child at Home in model 3 and Child 6-14 in model 4) are positive and
significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient on Child at Home in model 3
corresponds to $4,780 in additional annual compensation, and the coefficient on
Child 6-14 in model 4 corresponds to $5,390 in additional annual compensation.
In those two models, the coefficients on Female x Child at Home and Female
x Child 6-14 are also positive, and both are weakly significant at the 10 percent
level. However, the sum of Female and Female x Child at Home and the sum of
Female and Female x Child 6-14 are not significantly different from 0. This indi-
cates that, while having a child corresponds with higher compensation at the SEC
for all attorneys, there is no gender differential between men and women with
children.3
Finally, the coefficient on Companion Separate is not significantly different
from 0 in model 5. The coefficient on Female x Companion Separate in model 5
is negative but significant at only the 10.7 percent level, just beyond conventional
statistical significance. The sum of Female and Female x Companion Separate
is negative and weakly significant at the 10 percent level, which indicates that
women who experience a companion- separation event have $15,988 lower an-
nual compensation compared with men who experience a companion- separation
event.14 Limited evidence exists that family- shift-related situations may correlate
with lower pay for women compared with men.
3 We reestimated model 4 of Table 3 with the addition of Child 19+ and Female x Child 19+,
treating attorneys with no children as the base category. We obtained the same qualitative results
as in model 4 (unreported). The coefficients on Child 19+ and Female x Child 19+ are not signifi
cantly different from 0.
4 We performed a number of robustness checks on the results for scienter cases and total com-
pensation reported in the text. We looked at attorneys who experienced the birth of a child during
the time period of our data set. Setting the first birth year event as t - 0, we compared scienter
cases and total compensation for the year prior to the birth year of the first child (t - 1) with 4
years after the birth (t - 4), covering the prekindergarten years. We have only two male and two
female attorneys in our sample who experienced the birth of a child during the time period of our
data set and for whom we also have data for t - 1 and t - 4 (none of the attorneys had multiple
births). The mean of Scienter Cases at t - 1 was .5 for men and 0 for women. Men had a higher
number of scienter cases prior to the birth of their first child. The mean of Scienter Cases at t - 4
was 0 for men and 0 for women. While men decreased in the number of scienter cases, the small
number of observations makes it difficult to assess the general applicability of this change. The mean
of Total Compensation at t -- 1 was $150,200 for men and $155,200 for women. Women had
higher compensation than men prior to the birth of their first child. The mean compensation at t -
4 was $200,300 for men and $198,700 for women. By 4 years after the first birth year, women made
less than men. While this trend is interesting, the small number of observations makes it difficult
to assess the general applicability of this change. We also looked at attorneys who experienced a
companion separation event during the period of our data set. Setting the last year that the attorney
lived in the same household with an adult companion as t - 0, we compared scienter cases and total
compensation for the 2 years prior to the event year (t -2) with 2 years after the event year (t -
2). Because our data may only imprecisely identify the exact year of separation, we use a [ 2, 2] win
dow to capture the effect of separation. We have only three male and three female attorneys in our
sample who experienced a companion separation event in our data set and for whom we also have
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We also estimate attorney fixed-effects models to assess the impact of family-
related shifts on individual attorneys, using the same variables as in models 3-5
of Table 3 (with the exception of Female), including year effects and clustering
errors by attorney for each of the models. In these regressions (untabulated), the
coefficients for Child at Home and Child 6-14 are positive and significant at the
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. The interaction terms with Female in
these models, however, are all insignificant. That is, we do not find evidence that
any of our family-related shifts result in a differential change in compensation for
female attorneys in the attorney fixed-effects models.5
3.5. Who Goes?
We next examine departure dynamics in a multivariate framework employ-
ing a Cox proportional hazard model. Our dependent variable is leaving the SEC
(Left SEC) from 2004 to 2016. The Cox proportional hazard model we estimate is
as follows:
h(t, x) = ho (t)eX'.
In the Cox hazard model, h(t, X) is the hazard rate. The Cox model is semipara-
metric and does not require assumptions about the baseline hazard rate, h0(t).
The term X represents the vector of regressors, and /3 is a vector of estimated co-
efficients. We report the Cox models related to family characteristics in Table 4.
For model 1 of Table 4, we include a variable for the age of the attorney in the
year in question (Age). Instead of Age Squared, because nearing retirement may
lead to a discontinuous increase in the propensity to leave the SEC, we include
an indicator variable for whether the attorney is 55 or older as of 2004 (Close to
Retire). We also include the variables NLJ 250 Prior Partner, Prior Government
Attorney, Top Law School, and Regional Office. We posit that partners from large
law firms (Prior NLJ 250 Prior Partner) are likely coming to the SEC to burnish
their credentials and are therefore less likely to stay. Attorneys in regional offices
may have fewer attractive employment opportunities because they are outside the
data for t -2 and t - 2. The mean of Scienter Cases at t -2 was 0 for men and 0 for women.
The mean of Scienter Cases at t - 2 was 0 for men and 0 for women. The mean of Total Compensa
tion at t -2 was $172,900 for men and $172,800 for women. The mean of Total Compensation at
t - 2 was $199,000 for men and $193,200 for women. We are unable to discern any meaningful dif
ferences in number of scienter cases or total compensation due to a companion separation event for
men and women. The small number of observations, however, makes it difficult to assess the general
applicability of this finding.
" The coefficients on Female in our scienter case assignment models in Table 2 are negative and
significant, which indicates that Female corresponds to fewer scienter cases in any given year. In ad
dition, the coefficient on Scienter Cases in Prior Year in our compensation model (model 2 in Table
3) is positive and significant. One explanation for why Female corresponds to lower compensation
on average may be because of fewer scienter case assignments in the prior year. The negative coeffi
cient on Female in model 2 of Table 3, even after controlling for Scienter Cases in Prior Year, may
be due to fewer scienter case assignments in years before the prior year or a lower pay increase per
scienter case for women compared with men. Note though that the coefficient on Female in model 2
of Table 3, while negative, is not significantly different from 0.
Table 4
Hazard Models for Leaving the Securities and Exchange Commission
Age
Close to Retire
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2,526 2,223 2,217 2,217 2,558
Log likelihood 1,140.7 1,119.8 1,180.3 1,175.3 1,386.2
Note. Results are from hazard models on attorney year data of the departure of an attorney from the
Securities and Exchange Commission as the dependent variable. Nonexponentiated coefficients are
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major financial centers. Moreover, the cost of living in those cities may be more
manageable. We also include our primary variable of interest, Female, in model 1.
In model 1 of Table 4, the coefficient on Female is negative and significant at
the 1 percent level. Female attorneys are 44.6 percent less likely than male attor-
neys to leave the SEC. To assess whether having fewer scienter case assignments
in the prior year is related to the propensity of women to leave the SEC, we add
Scienter Cases in Prior Year to model 1 and report the results in model 2. The co-
efficient on Scienter Cases in Prior Year is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level. Participation in scienter cases appears to be a factor for attorneys choosing
to leave the SEC. The coefficient on Female remains negative and significant (at
the 1 percent level) in model 2.16
What explains the difference in propensity to leave the SEC? Women may be
less likely to leave the SEC because of its attractive work environment and pref-
erences relating to the work-family balance. To test the importance of the SEC's
work environment and work-family-related preferences in explaining the gender
gap in propensity to leave the SEC, we analyze the importance of having children
at home and companion separation.
We start with the Cox hazard model in model 1 of Table 4 and add the indi-
cator variable Child at Home and the interaction term Female x Child at Home.
We report the results in model 3 of Table 4.
In model 3, the coefficient on Child at Home is positive and significant at the 5
percent level. For male attorneys, having a child at home corresponds with a 48.6
percent increased likelihood of leaving the SEC compared with male attorneys
without a child at home. The coefficient on Female x Child at Home is negative
and not significantly different from 0, which indicates that having a child has a
similar positive correspondence with the propensity for female attorneys to leave
the SEC. The sum of Female and Female x Child at Home is negative and signifi-
cant at the 12.5 percent level, beyond conventional levels of significance. Thus, in
this estimation we do not find evidence that women with children at home have
a differential propensity to leave the SEC compared with men with children at
home.
For attorneys with children at home, it is possible that the trade-offs between
childcare responsibilities and financial burdens vary with a child's age. Younger
children need more care, while children nearing college age are expensive. Ac-
cordingly, we also look at different age categories of children at home, including
children who are 5 or younger (Child < 5), between six and 14 (Child 6-14), and
between five and 18 (Child 5-18), substituting them in model 4 for the Child at
Home variables in model 3.
In model 4 of Table 4, the coefficient on Child 6-14 is positive and significant
16 As a robustness test, we replaced the number of scienter cases for the prior year with the num
ber of insider trading cases for the prior year in model 2 of Table 4. We obtain similar but not iden
tical results to those in model 2 of Table 4 (unreported). The coefficient on Female remains negative
and significant at he 1 percent level, but the coefficient on the number of insider trading cases is not
significantly different from 0. Although participation in scienter cases is correlated with departure
from the SEC, we do not find a similar correlation with participation in insider trading cases.
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at the 1 percent level, which indicates that male attorneys are 67.5 percent more
likely to leave the SEC when they live with a child between 6 and 14 years of age
compared with male SEC attorneys without children at home. In contrast, Fe-
male x Child 6-14 is negative and significant at the 10 percent level, and the sum
of Female and Female x Child 6-14 is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level, which indicates that having a child between 6 and 14 years of age correlates
with lower likelihood of female attorneys leaving the SEC compared with male
attorneys. These results make sense if one thinks that women are more likely
than men to bear responsibility for the care of children. Assuming that the SEC
is a relatively friendly place for the balance of work-family responsibilities, and
if women take on a greater share of the family responsibilities, we should expect
to see women being less likely to leave the SEC during the years when childcare
responsibilities are the most demanding. The coefficient on Child 15-18 is not
significantly different from 0, which indicates that male attorneys are not more
likely to leave the SEC when they have a child in high school compared with other
male attorneys. In contrast, the coefficient on Female x Child 15-18 is positive
and significant at the 1 percent level, which indicates a significant difference in
how having high-school-age children affects women compared with men in de-
ciding to leave the SEC. Note also that while the coefficient on Female is negative
and significant at the 10 percent level in model 4, the sum of Female and Female
x Child 15-18 is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Women with a
child in high school are more likely to leave the SEC than men. The differing pat-
tern in propensity to leave the SEC for men and women with children of different
ages is consistent with the theory that gender differences in either preferences or
responsibilities regarding the work-family balance affect how men and women
think about their departure from the SEC.
17
The financial shock of a divorce or similar separation may also induce some
attorneys to leave the SEC seeking higher pay. Therefore, in model 5 we substi-
tute the indicator variable Companion Separate and the interaction term Female
x Companion Separate. The latter variable measures the differential effect of a
companion- separation event on women.
In model 5 of Table 4 the coefficient on Companion Separate is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level. A companion- separation event corresponds to
a 173 percent increase in the likelihood of departing the SEC, a plausible result if
separations create budgetary strain.' The coefficient on Female x Companion
" We reestimated model 4 of Table 4 with the addition of Child 19+ and Female x Child 19+ to
model 4, treating attorneys with no children as the base category. We obtained the same qualitative
results as in model 4 (unreported) with one difference: the coefficient on Child 6 14 remains posi
tive but now is significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients on Child 19+ and Female x Child
19+ are not significantly different from 0.
"As a robustness test, we replaced Companion Separate with an indicator variable equal to one
only for the year that an adult companion stopped living in the same household and zero other
wise and an interaction term between that indicator variable and Female. The coefficient on the
1 year alternative indicator variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, while the coeffi
cient on the interaction term is not significantly different from 0, which indicates that a companion
separation event has the similar effect of increasing the propensity to leave the SEC for both male
and female attorneys.
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Table 5
Where Do They Go? Destination by Gender
Male Female All
N % N % N %
Private practice associate or counsel 15 10.0 5 10.6 20 10.2
Private practice partner 54 36.0 11 23.4 65 33.0
Financial or compliance industry 45 30.0 12 25.5 57 28.9
Nonprofit or academia 3 2.0 6 12.8 9 4.6
Other government 18 12.0 9 19.2 27 13.7
Retirement or nonlegal/compliance 15 10.0 4 8.5 19 9.6
Total 150 100.0 47 100.0 197 100.0
Note. x 2 - 12.4781 (pr - .020).
Separate, however, is not significantly different from 0. What this tells us is that
a companion- separation event increases the likelihood for both men and women
to leave the SEC, but we do not find a significant gender-based difference in this
regard.19
3.6. More on Selection and the Decision to Leave
One possibility for the differential propensity for male and female attorneys to
leave the SEC is a difference in post-SEC employment options available to men
compared with women. Using publicly available information, we track the em-
ployment choices of the attorneys in our sample through June 2016. We collected
career path information through Internet searches using the Martindale- Hubbell
data set, LexisNexis, LinkedIn, and Google.
In Table 5, we break down the destination for lawyers leaving the SEC by gen-
der. More than half of the attorneys employed by the division in 2004 were work-
ing in the private sector by 2016. We see some patterns. The percentages of law-
yers taking jobs as law firm associates are indistinguishable in gender terms, but
men are more likely to take a position as a law firm partner (36.0 percent of all
men who left the SEC as compared with 23.4 percent of all women who left the
SEC) and marginally more likely to take a position in financial services or com-
pliance (30.0 percent of men compared with 25.5 percent of women). Women,
9 The multivariate models in Tables 2 4 are at the attorney year level of data. One concern is the
relatively small number of observations, in particular for the interaction terms in our models. With
respect to the interaction terms for children, the number of attorney year level observations range
from a high of 139 (Female x Child 6 14) to a low of 46 (Female x Child 0 5) in Table 2, a high
of 116 (Female x Child 6 14) to a low of 39 (Female x Child 0 5) in Table 3, and a high of 144
(Female x Child 6 14) to a low of 49 (Female x Child 0 5) in Table 4. We have fewer observations
for Companion Separate, with six, six, and seven observations for Female x Companion Separate
in Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The lack of statistically significant coefficients in particular for Fe
male x Companion Separate in our multivariate models could be due to a lack of statistical power.
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on the other hand, took more nonprofit or academic positions and other govern-
ment positions.0
A caveat here is that the observed positions taken after the SEC reflect not only
differences in supply but also in the demand for positions by men and women.
We cannot identify shifts in employment opportunities during the time period of
our study that may differ for men versus women. We are therefore unable to test
the causal relationship between the supply of employment opportunities and the
propensity of women to leave the SEC. We nonetheless cannot reject the possibil-
ity that differences in the availability of post-SEC positions is causally related to
the lower propensity of women to leave the SEC.
4. Conclusion
For this project, we chose an institutional setting in which prior research sug-
gests the gender gap should be small. We found evidence of gaps in assignments
and pay, with men doing better, particularly with respect to assignments. More
tentatively, it may be that the differential in assignments is not the result of all
women getting fewer high-quality assignments but is instead the result of a sub-
set of women (in the middle stages of their careers) receiving or taking on fewer
of these assignments. Of particular interest-given the dominant narrative in the
literature that childcare responsibilities are a key driver of gender disparities-is
the lack of any indication that the disparities that do exist within the SEC are
driven by differences in childcare responsibilities. Our conjecture here, and it is
but a hypothesis that needs a separate study to test, is that institutions can reduce
the childcare- related gender disparity.
A clear difference in our findings is that men who leave the SEC are more likely
to move into lucrative private-sector jobs. Women, who are less likely to move in
the first place, are more likely to move to other government jobs or nonprofits.
Although the SEC may be able to ameliorate the gender gap in its internal hierar-
chy, gender gaps creep in when there is an interaction of the internal and external
markets. This article has begun to explore the effect of linkages between relatively
nondiscriminatory institutions and external markets that exhibit discriminatory
patterns. Our hope is that future studies will examine other government agencies,
and possibly nonprofit organizations, and their connections with external private
labor markets.
2 0
We are unable to obtain post SEC salaries for attorneys in our data set who exited the SEC, so
we cannot calculate the overall gender gap in wages that results when exit options are taken into
consideration. That said, on the basis of informal conversations with former SEC attorneys who
pointed out that almost no one is ever fired from the SEC and that workloads in the private sector
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Appendix B
Data Collection
There are 3,825 individuals listed in the SEC's 2004 telephone directory. We fo-
cus on individuals either designated as "ENF" for the Division of Enforcement of
the SEC (429 individuals) or as working in an SEC regional office (2,021 individ-
uals). We then screened them for attorneys working either for the Division of En-
forcement or in a trial or enforcement capacity in an SEC regional office, which
leaves us with 542 individuals. Freedom of Information Act requests yielded job
titles, pay grades, and postings through 2015. Pay-grade information is from Fed-
eralPay.org, which reports data from the Office of Personnel Management.
We developed a new methodology to gather demographic variables for the SEC
attorneys in the sample. For each attorney, we determined his or her law school
and college, including graduation years, from searches on Martindale- Hubbell
and LinkedIn. If we were unable to determine the law school and college from the
searches, we supplemented with broader Internet searches, including state bar
websites.2' We then used the college and law school graduation years to develop a
rough estimate of the age of the attorney (for example, we estimated age by sub-
tracting 21 years from the college graduation year).
Using the attorney's name, SEC office location, and estimated age, we then per-
formed a search for the attorney using a premium subscription to Whitepages in
early 2018. Among the search results from Whitepages, we looked at only indi-
viduals whose age was within plus or minus 2 years of our estimated age and a
location within a 90-minute commuting distance of the SEC office (as given by
Google Maps using the fastest mode of transport without any traffic). If there
was only one match, we moved forward with our data collection from the White-
pages match. If there was more than one match, we looked at the address history
of each candidate to determine whether one more closely matched the work his-
tory of the attorney. For example, if an attorney worked in the Philadelphia of-
fice from 2004 to 2006 and then switched to the Miami office from 2007 to 2015,
we would look to see if a candidate's address history included an address within
commuting distance to the Philadelphia office from 2004 to 2006 and to the Mi-
ami office from 2007 to 2015. If a candidate matched the office location history,
then we treated the candidate as the SEC attorney's Whitepages match. If no can-
didate matched that history, then we treated the SEC attorney as having no match
in Whitepages. We were able to find a match for 493 of our initial 542 SEC attor-
neys (91.0 percent of the sample).
Once we found a match on Whitepages, we collected information about age
and the history of addresses for the SEC attorney over time. We also collected in-
formation about family members, including names and ages as listed on White-
pages. For each family member, we also conducted a Whitepages search to de-
termine the history of address locations. We used the family member data to
determine two types of family relationships.
21 See, for an example, State Bar of California, My State Bar Profile (https://members.calbar.ca.gov).
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Companion. We do not rely on legal definitions of marriage at specific points
in time but instead look functionally at whether two adults lived in the same
household. We define a companion as any individual who is not a sibling or par-
ent and lived in the same household as the SEC attorney and was at least 21 years
old during all times there was an overlap in address. We treat an individual as a
sibling of an SEC attorney if the individual and SEC attorney lived in the same
household at any point in time when each was under 21 years old, and we treat
an individual as a parent of the SEC attorney if the individual was over 21 years
old and the SEC attorney was under 21 years old and lived in the same household
at any point in time. We also treat individuals as a sibling or parent of an SEC at-
torney if we have some external verification of the relationship (such as through
an obituary). We recorded the name and age of each companion. We also tracked
both the start year of the address overlap (which may span multiple addresses)
and the end year of the address overlap. If the end year is before 2018, we treat it
as the year of a companion- separation event.
Children. We define a child as a family member under 21 years old who lived
in the same household as the SEC attorney. For each child, we recorded name
and age.
Whitepages contains less complete information about children who are still
minors. To both supplement and verify the Whitepages information, we also
used Internet searches to find obituaries from 2013 onward for any family mem-
ber age 70 or older (based on name and last listed location in Whitepages for the
family member). Using the obituaries, we were able to determine for a subset of
our sample the presence (or absence) of children for the SEC attorneys. Using
this methodology, we were able to establish the presence of children for 247 of
our SEC attorneys and confirm the absence of children for 27 of our SEC attor-
neys. To fine-tune the information further, we also did broader Internet searches,
including searches on social media sites (such as Facebook), school websites, and
school sport websites. These additional searches helped us in many cases to con-
firm the ages of the children in question. If we could only find only the grade of
the child, we assumed that those in ninth grade were 14 years old and used the
corresponding offset age for other grades. This secondary methodology allowed
us to identify the age of at least one child for 203 of our SEC attorneys.
The quality of information from Whitepages and the obituaries is, we believe,
highly accurate-particularly since we typically obtained not only the number of
children and their ages but also the names of the children. In each instance in
which we obtained the names of children from Whitepages and from obituaries
for a particular SEC attorney, the names largely matched. The matches were not
always exact. Sometimes we noticed variations in the first names such as James in
one source and Jim in another source. In addition, if the obituary was published
earlier than 2018, it will not contain the names of children born after its publica-
tion. Nevertheless, because our method of determining the presence of children
is novel, we did an additional check for the quality of the data. We asked two of
the former SEC lawyers who had been generous enough to give us comments on
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an early draft of this project to do a verification exercise. For a subset of 100 at-
torneys for whom we had information and whom they recalled, we compared our
findings with their recall. For 10 of those 100, they had no recall as to whether the
lawyers had children. For the 90 that they did recall (88, plus the two of them),
our results matched their recollection in every case.
Appendix C
Abnormal Total Compensation
As an alternate assessment of compensation patterns at the SEC for male and
female attorneys based on age, we examine that portion of compensation not ex-
plained by pre-SEC characteristics. We estimate a model for Total Compensation
based solely on pre-SEC characteristics of the attorneys as follows, clustering er-
rors by attorney:
Total Compensation = a + /1l1NLJ 250 Prior Partner,
+ Q32Prior Government Attorney + 33,Top Law School
+ Year Fixed Effects + i.
We use the residuals from this regression model as our measure of the amount
of total compensation that is not explained by pre-SEC characteristics (the ab-
normal total compensation). The mean abnormal total compensation is $894 for
men and $ 1,769 for women. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level
(p .002). We depict the mean values for abnormal total compensation by age
for male and female attorneys at the SEC in Figure C1.
~N /
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Figure C1. Mean abnormal total compensation
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Figure C1 displays a pattern for abnormal total compensation that is qualita-
tively similar although not identical to the one we observed for total compensa-
tion by age in Figure 2. In Figure C1, note that male SEC attorneys receive higher
abnormal total compensation from their mid-40s to early 50s, similar to Figure 2.
In Figure 2, we observed a reversal when women receive higher total compensa-
tion compared with men in their mid-50s. We do not observe the same reversal
in abnormal total compensation, but the gap between men and women does nar-
row for abnormal total compensation in their 50s.
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